Can Science lead us to a Definition of Art? by Coe, Kathryn
	  
rivista	  on-­‐line	  del	  Seminario	  Permanente	  di	  Estetica	   	  
	   anno	  VI,	  numero	  2	   	  
pag.	  153	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  2/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	  
Can	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  lead	  us	  to	  a	  Definition	  of	  Art?	  
Kathryn	  Coe	  	   	  
	  
The	  whole	  science	  of	  aesthetics	  fails	  to	  do	  what	  we	  might	  expect	  
from	   it,	  being	  a	  mental	  activity	  calling	   itself	  a	   science;	  namely	   it	  
does	  not	  define	  the	  qualities	  and	  laws	  of	  art	  […]	  	  
L.	  Tolstoy,	  What	  is	  Art,	  1899	  
	  
Introduction	   	  
If	  Plato’s	  discussions	  count	  as	  a	   formal	  beginning	  of	  attempts	  to	  define	  art,	  more	  than	  
2000	  years	  have	  gone	  by	  without	  reaching	  an	  agreement.	  Defining	  art	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  
so	   difficult	   that	   Lorand	   ([2000]:	   250)	   was	   inspired	   to	   write	   that	   every	   «proposed	  
definition	  has	  been	  demolished,	   renounced,	  and	   its	  effectiveness	  denied»,	  and	  Munro	  
([1949]:	   5)	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   arts	   «are	   too	   intangible	   and	   changing	   to	   be	   defined	   or	  
classified».	   Scientists,	   taught	   the	   importance	   of	   definitions,	   do	   not	   attempt	   to	  
objectively	  define	   the	   term	   (see	  Bullot,	  Reber	   [2013];	   Tooby,	  Cosmides	   [2001];	  Wallin,	  
Merker,	   Brown	   [2000]).	   Richard	   Alexander	   ([2005]:	   5),	   a	   scientist	   and	   astute	   thinker,	  
wrote	   that	  he	  wanted	   to	  be	  vague	   in	  using	  words	   like	  art	  because	  he	  did	  not	  want	   to	  
limit	  what	  was	  discussed.	  The	  failure	  to	  define	  art	   is	  surely	  part	  of	  what	  led	  Tooby	  and	  
Cosmides	   ([2001]:	   7)	   to	  write	   that	   the	   arts	   are	   one	   of	   the	   realms	   of	   human	   behavior	  
«that	  have	  resisted	  any	  easy	  or	  straightforward	  explanation	  in	  Darwinian	  terms».	  	  
Over	  60	  years	  ago,	  Hodin	   (1951)	  argued	   that	   science,	  at	   that	  point	   in	   time,	  did	  not	  
permit	  the	  development	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  art.	  We	  assume	  that	  scientific	  theory,	  specifically	  
modern	  Darwinian	  Theory,	   is	  now	  at	  a	  point	  at	  which,	  as	  Denis	  Dutton	   (2003)	  pointed	  
out,	   it	   can	  begin	   to	   contribute	   to	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	   function	  of	   art	   and	  place	   a	  
limit	  on	  philosophers’	  ability	  to	  speculate.	  As	  this	  understanding	  depends,	  however,	  on	  
reaching	  an	  agreement	  about	  art’s	  definition,	  I	  briefly	  review	  attempts	  to	  define	  art	  and	  
then	   critically	   evaluate	   Dutton’s	   (2006)	   12-­‐property	   cluster	   theory.	   Dutton’s	   list	   of	  
properties	   was	   selected	   as	   it	   holds	   promise	   for	   helping	   us	   identify	   art’s	   fundamental	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properties	  because,	  first,	  his	  list	  is	  built	  upon	  widely	  accepted	  thinking	  in	  aesthetics	  and	  
the	  properties	  he	  proposes	  are	   compatible	  with	   those	   found	   in	  other	   cluster	   theories.	  
Further,	  Dutton’s	   list	   is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  that	  purports	  to	  be	  able	  to	  broadly	  account	  for	  
works	  of	  art	   found	  around	  the	  world,	  a	   feature	  that	   is	  necessary	   if	  we	  are	  to	  come	  up	  
with	   a	   definition	   that	   works	   universally.	   Finally,	   Dutton,	   who	   is	   known	   for	   his	  
appreciation	  of	  evolutionary	  approaches,	  appreciates	  that	  before	  we	  can	   identify	  what	  
art	  does	  –	  that	  is,	  its	  possible	  evolutionary	  function	  –	  we	  need	  to	  define	  what	  art	  is.	  	  
Background	  
Plato’s	  definition	  specified	  that	  art	  replicates;	  that	  is,	  it	  imitates	  reality.	  Aristotle	  agreed,	  
defining	   art	   as	   mimesis,	   but	   adding	   the	   criterion	   that	   art	   also	   had	   an	   effect	   –	   it	   was	  
cathartic.	   Definitions	   proposed	   since	   have	   built	   on	   this	   thinking,	   focusing	   on	   art	   as	  
representational	   (imitating	   reality);	   as	   formal	   (as	  was	   implied	   in	   Plato’s	   discussion,	   art	  
has	  such	  things	  as	  line,	  color,	  pattern,	  symmetry	  or	  a	  certain	  form);	  and/or	  as	  expressive	  
(it	   expresses	   –	   and	   arouses	   –	   emotion).	   Disagreements	   over	   these	   characteristics	   and	  
the	  relative	  importance	  that	  each	  property	  has,	  have	  split	  discussions	  of	  art’s	  definition	  
into	   two	  basic	  groups,	  one	  of	  which	  either	   ignores	   the	  need	   for	  a	  definition	  or	  argues	  
that	  the	  term	  cannot	  be	  defined.	  The	  other	  camp	  attempts	  to	  devise	  a	  widely	  accepted	  
definition	  of	  the	  term.	  	  
Into	  the	  first	  category	  falls	  the	  non-­‐essentialist	  position,	  which	  postulates	  that	  there	  
are	   no	  necessary	   and	   sufficient	   properties	   to	   art	   –	   all	  we	   can	   find	   are	   similarities	   and	  
relationships,	  all	  we	  can	  do	  is	  describe,	  not	  define	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953];	  Weitz	  [1956]).	  
Dismissed	  by	  many	  as	  not	   scientifically	  useful,	   this	  approach	  has	  been	  said	   to	  be	  «too	  
vacuous	  to	  carry	  the	  explanatory	  burden»	  (Davies	  [2004]:	  297).	  	  
The	   second	   group	   argues	   that	   if	  we	   examine	   a	  word’s	   various	   usages,	  we	  will	   find	  
some	  element	  (or	  elements)	  that	  is	  common	  to	  all	  of	  them,	  but	  not	  to	  other	  things,	  and	  
we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  isolate	  that	  element	  as	  the	  essence	  that	  defines	  the	  category	  of	  things	  
(McEvilley	   [1992]:	   166).	   Dickie	   ([1971]:	   41),	   for	   example,	   explained	   that	   definitions	  
should	   attempt	   to	   «specify	   the	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   needed	   for	  
something	   to	  be	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  A	  necessary	  condition	   for	  being	  an	  X	   is	  a	  characteristic	  
which	   any	   object	   must	   have	   in	   order	   to	   be	   an	   X.	   A	   sufficient	   condition	   of	   an	   X	   is	   a	  
characteristic,	  which,	  if	  an	  object	  has	  that	  characteristic,	  it	  is	  an	  X».	  	  
Worded	  more	  skeptically,	  «either	  all	  works	  of	  art	  […]	  have	  some	  common	  quality	  or	  
when	  we	  speak	  of	  ‘works	  of	  art’	  we	  gibber»	  (Bell	  [1958]:	  79).	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In	   trying	   to	   identify	  art’s	  necessary	  and	   sufficient	  properties,	  one	  problem,	  pointed	  
out	  by	  a	  number	  of	  scholars,	  including	  Dutton	  (2006),	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  if	  we	  
are	   trying	   to	   define	   objects	   (e.g.,	   sculptures,	   paintings,	   decorated	   objects),	  
performances	  (e.g.,	  dance,	  storytelling),	  psychological	  underpinnings,	  evolved	  proximate	  
or	   ultimate	   functions,	   the	   behavior	   of	   making	   and/or	   viewing	   art,	   or	   the	   emotional	  
response	  aroused	  by	  art,	  or	  all	  or	  some	  of	  these.	  	  
Further,	  the	  term	  is	  often	  used	  metaphorically.	  Darwin	  (1871),	  as	  one	  example,	  who,	  
according	   to	  his	   son,	  Francis,	   regarded	  himself	  «as	  an	   ignoramus	   in	  all	  matters	  of	  art»	  
(Darwin	  [1887],	  83),	  used	  the	  term	  art	  frequently	  in	  The	  Descent	  of	  Man	  (1871),	  writing,	  
for	  example,	  about	  the	  «art	  of	  poetry»	  (ivi:	  44)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  «art	  of	  making	  fire»,	  the	  
«art	  of	  grinding	  rough	  flint	  tools»	  (ivi:	  176),	  the	  «art	  of	  enumeration»	  (ivi:	  194),	  and	  the	  
«art	   of	   writing»	   (ivi:	   195).	   He	   also	   claimed	   that	   «language	   is	   an	   art,	   like	   brewing	   or	  
baking»	   (ivi:	  53)	  and	   that	  barking	  was	  a	  new	  art	   that	  distinguished	  domesticated	  dogs	  
from	  ancestral	  wild	  species1.	  Similar	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  art,	  led	  Ruchstuhl	  (1916)	  to	  write:	  
«What	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  word-­‐Art?	  The	  word	  has	  been	  used	  to	  designate	  everything	  
under	  the	  sun	  from	  “The	  Art	  of	  Poetry”,	  to	  the	  “Art	  of	  Goose	  Washing”;	  from	  “The	  Art	  of	  
Living”	  to	  the	  “Art	  of	  Dying”,	  until	  every	  charlatan	  has	  his	  pet	  definition	  which	  he	  knows	  
he	  cannot	  successfully	  defend».	  
This	   metaphorical	   usage	   of	   the	   term,	   however,	   may	   help	   provide	   important	   clues	  
regarding	   art’s	   definition.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   point	  we	   turn	   again	   to	  Darwin	   ([1871]:	   59)	  
who	   went	   on	   to	   explain	   that	   language	   is	   an	   art,	   «in	   the	   sense	   of	   its	   having	   been	  
elaborately	  and	  methodically	  formed».	  Art,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  an	  activity	  that	  requires,	  or	  
can	  be	   improved	  by,	   skill	   and	  practice,	   a	  proposal	   that	  we	  will	   further	  examine	   in	   this	  
paper.	  
All	   definitions	   that	   attempt	   to	   specify	   art’s	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   characteristics	  
have	   been	   criticized	   and	   most	   have	   been	   dismissed.	   Tolstoy’s	   definition	   has	   been	  
criticized	   because	   he	   may	   have	   developed	   it	   to	   serve	   his	   own	   aim	   of	   social	   reform	  
(Ruckstahl	  [1916]:	  75).	  Bias	  per	  se,	  however,	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  accuracy	  of	  a	  definition	  
because	  bias	  is	  only	  part	  of	  their	  origin.	  While	  bias	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  inaccurate	  definition,	  it	  
also	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   accurate	   one;	   the	   accuracy	   or	   inaccuracy	   of	   a	   definition	   is	  
determined	   not	   by	   showing	   a	   person	   was	   biased	   but	   by	   whether	   or	   not	   it	   fits	   the	  
observable	  facts.	  	  
Other	  definitions	  have	  been	  dismissed	  because	  they	  are	  said	  to	  be	  limited;	  as	  Dutton	  
([2006]:	  375)	  pointed	  out,	  many	  of	   these	   theorists	  «began	  with	  a	  particular	  paradigm,	  
meaning	   they	  want	   to	   explain	   a	   particular	   form	  of	   art	   (Greek	   tragedy,	   say	   or	   abstract	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music)»,	  and	   thus	   their	  definition	  cannot	  be	  more	  widely	  applied	   to	  account	   for	  other	  
forms	  of	  art.	  The	  institutional	  theory	  position,	  which	  specified	  that	  X	  is	  an	  art	  object	  if	  it	  
is	  displayed	  in	  an	  art	  space	  (Danto	  [1964]),	  was	  criticized	  because,	  clearly,	  not	  everything	  
displayed	  in	  an	  art	  space	  is	  art	  (e.g.,	  the	  fire	  alarm	  on	  a	  wall)	  and	  public	  art	  is	  displayed	  
outside	  art	  institutions.	  The	  proposal	  that	  the	  significant	  form	  in	  art	  (Bell	  [1958])	  arouses	  
an	  aesthetic	  emotion	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  its	  apparent	  circularity	  and	  because	  it	  is	  not	  
clear	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  emotion	  associated	  only	  with	  viewing	  art.	  For	  these	  and	  other	  
reasons,	  «the	  history	  of	   the	  philosophy	  of	  art»,	   to	  quote	  Dean	   ([2003]:	  29)	  «is	   littered	  
with	  failed	  attempts	  to	  provide	  definitions	  of	  art».	  	  
As	  there	  has	  been	  no	  widespread	  agreement	  on	  what	  art’s	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  
properties	  might	  be,	  recent	  attempts	  to	  define	  art	  have	  resurrected	  the	  non-­‐essentialist	  
position	  and	  proposed	  what	  is	  called	  a	  cluster	  theory.	  A	  cluster	  theory	  provides	  a	  list	  of	  
properties	   none	   of	   which	   may	   be	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   something’s	   being	   art,	  
meaning	   that	   «there	   is	   no	   property	   that	   all	   objects	   falling	   under	   the	   concept	   must	  
possess»	   (see	  Dutton	   [2006];	   Gaut	   [2005]:	   274;	   also	   Anderson	   [1979];	   Blocker	   [1994];	  
Moravcsik	  [1992]).	  However,	  all	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  properties	  would	  together	  
be	   sufficient	   to	   refer	   to	   something	   as	   art;	   X	   is	   art	   by	   virtue	   of	   satisfying	   an	   often	  
unspecified	  number	  of	  criteria.	  	  
Dutton’s	   (2006)	   cluster	   theory	   has	   twelve	   properties	   –	   Direct	   Pleasure,	   Skill	   or	  
Virtuosity,	   Style,	   Novelty	   and	   Creativity,	   Criticism,	   Representation,	   Special	   Focus,	  
Expressive	  Individuality,	  Emotional	  Saturation,	  Intellectual	  Challenge,	  Art	  Traditions	  and	  
Institutions,	  and	  Imaginative	  Experience.	  While	  he	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  these	  properties	  as	  
design	  features,	  or	  as	  universals,	  he	  sees	  them	  as	  such	  as	  he	  claims	  they	  are	  useful	  for	  
studying	  art	   across	   cultures.	  Dutton	   ([2006]	  369)	  begins	  his	  discussion	  by	  pointing	  out	  
the	   limitations	  of	   these	  properties	  and	  acknowledging	   that	  some	  of	   the	  properties	  are	  
more	   central	   to	   a	   definition	   than	   others;	   Skill	   or	   Virtuosity,	   for	   example,	   is	   a	   more	  
important	   property	   than	   is	   Criticism.	   Keeping	   these	   caveats	   in	   mind,	   now	   turn	   to	   an	  
evaluation	  of	  Dutton’s	  properties	  using	  the	  definition	  criteria	  outlined	  below.	  	  
Dutton’s	  12	  properties	  of	  art	  
Assumptions.	   –	   Given	   the	   complexity	   of	   art	   –	   art	   takes	   various	   forms	   (e.g.,	   music,	  
storytelling,	   dance,	   plastic	   arts)	   –	   it	   is	   important,	   borrowing	   from	   Hartwig	   (2008),	   to	  
avoid	   an	   implicit	   definition,	   as	   resulting	   studies	   will	   «usually	   be	   highly	   be	   confused,	  
precisely	  because	  it	  [the	  term]	  has	  not	  been	  thought	  through	  comprehensively	  (ix).	  Art	  
forms,	   like	  any	  other	  observable	  phenomena,	  can	  be	  defined	   (see	  Boyer	   [2004])	  and	  a	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scientifically	   rigorous	   definition	   will	   specify	   necessary	   and/or	   sufficient	   properties.	  
Because	  art,	  according	  to	  the	  evidence	  available,	  is	  both	  ancient	  and	  widespread,	  it	  may	  
be	   an	   adaptation.	   Before	  we	   can	   begin	   to	   identify	   the	   effect	   of	   art	   that	   promoted	   its	  
persistence	  –	  why	  art	  is	  adaptive	  –	  a	  definition	  is	  needed.	  	  
Criteria	  for	  evaluation	  
Identifiable:	  Are	   the	   properties	   identifiable	   by	   the	   senses?	   This	   topic,	   admittedly,	   has	  
been	  the	   focus	  of	  much	  philosophical	  debate,	  criticized,	  among	  other	   things,	   for	  being	  
too	   reductionistic.	   Even	   though	   art	   may	   prove	   to	   be	   much	   more	   than	   its	   visible	  
characteristics,	   a	   definition	   that	   focuses	   solely	   on	   characteristics	   that	   are	   clearly	  
identifiable	  provides	  a	  strong	  position	  for	  coming	  up	  with	  a	  testable	  definition.	  	  
Clarity:	  Are	  the	  terms	  clearly	  defined	  or	  have	  clear	  referents?	  Writing	  in	  a	  simpler	  time,	  
Jones	  ([1946:	  2-­‐3)	  explained	  that	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  science	  writing	   is	  to	   inform	  and	   it	  
does	  this	  by	  stating	  facts	  accurately,	  using	  words	  with	  identifiable	  referents	  and	  avoiding	  
devices	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  emotions,	  such	  as	  exaggeration	  or	  the	  use	  of	  a	  metaphor	  that	  
can	  be	  open	  to	  many	  interpretations.	  
Non-­‐functional:	  Does	   the	   property	   refer	   to	   what	   art	   is	   rather	   than	   what	   art	   does,	   its	  
function?	  Establishing	  the	  function	  of	  something	  still	  leaves	  open	  to	  debate	  the	  question	  
of	   what	   that	   something	   is.	   Spiro,	   in	   his	   argument	   against	   functional	   definitions	   of	  
religion,	   wrote:	   «unless	   religion	   is	   defined	   substantively,	   it	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	  
delineate	  its	  boundaries»	  ([1966]:	  90;	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  
Cross-­‐cultural:	  Are	  the	  properties	  found	  in	  objects	  made	  across	  cultures	  that	  we	  refer	  to	  
as	   or	   that	   closely	   resemble	   art	   objects?	   This	   criteria,	   as	  Munro	   (1951)	   pointed	   out	   is	  
important	   because	   once	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	   cross-­‐cultural	   record,	   «the	   history	   of	  
aesthetics	  will	  have	  to	  be	  completely	  rewritten	  from	  a	  much	  more	  cosmopolitan	  point	  of	  
view»	  (ivi:	  164);	  «All	  aesthetic	  theory	  before	  the	   late	  nineteenth	  century	  was	  cramped	  
and	  distorted	  by	  ignorance	  of	  exotic	  and	  primitive	  styles	  of	  art»	  (ivi:	  166).	  	  
Description:	  Are	  the	  properties	  identifiable	  by	  the	  senses?	  
As	   art,	   during	   the	   past	   few	   centuries,	   has	   been	   associated	   with	   the	   term	   aesthetic,	  
which,	  etymologically,	  is	  concerned	  about	  feelings	  or	  emotions	  (Fagg	  [1973]),	  definitions	  
of	   art	   often	   focus	  on	  emotions	   art	   is	   said	   to	   arouse.	  A	  number	  of	  Dutton’s	   properties	  
refer	  to	  and/or	  are	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  emotion.	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In	  regard	  to	  the	  property	  Direct	  Pleasure,	  Dutton	  writes	  ([2006]:	  369),	  «The	  art	  object	  
–	   narrative,	   story,	   crafted	   artifact,	   or	   visual	   and	   aural	   performance	   –	   is	   valued	   as	   a	  
source	   of	   immediate	   experiential	   pleasure	   in	   itself,	   and	   not	   primarily	   for	   its	   utility	   in	  
producing	   something	   else	   that	   is	   either	   useful	   or	   pleasurable».	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   write,	  
«grasping	   the	   detailed	   coherence	   of	   a	   tightly	   potted	   study	   can	   give	   pleasure	   […]	   the	  
composition	   of	   a	   landscape	   painting	   can	   induce	   pleasure;	   surprising	   harmonic	  
modulations	   and	   rhythmic	   acceleration	   can	  give	   pleasure	   in	  music,	   and	   so	   forth».	   The	  
«enjoyment	   of	   artistic	   beauty	   often	   derives	   from	   multilayered	   yet	   distinguishable	  
pleasures	  that	  are	  experienced	  either	  simultaneously	  or	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  each	  other.	  
These	   layered	   experiences	   can	   be	   most	   effective	   when	   separable	   pleasure	   are	  
coherently	   related	   to	   each	   other,	   or	   interact	  with	   each	   other	   –	   or	   roughly	   put	   in	   the	  
structural	   form,	   color,	   and	   subject	  matter	   of	   a	   painting,	   or	   the	  music,	   drama,	   singing,	  
directed	  acting,	  and	  sets	  of	  an	  opera».	  	  
The	   property	   Emotional	   Saturation,	   Dutton	   ([2006],	   369)	   writes,	   refers	   to	   the	   fact	  
that	   in	  «varying	  degrees,	   the	  experience	  of	  works	  of	  art	   is	  shot	  through	  with	  emotion.	  
Emotion	   in	   art	   divides	  broadly	   into	   two	  kinds».	  While	   these	   two	  kinds	  of	   emotion	  are	  
«fused»	  we	  first	  find	  «emotions	  provided	  or	  incited	  by	  the	  represented	  content	  of	  art	  –	  
the	  pathos	  of	  the	  scene	  portrayed	  in	  a	  painting,	  a	  comic	  sequence	  in	  a	  play,	  a	  vision	  of	  
death	  in	  a	  poem.	  These	  are	  the	  normal	  emotions	  of	  life,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  
cross-­‐cultural	   psychological	   research	   outside	   aesthetics	   […].There	   is	   a	   second,	  
alternative	  sense,	  however,	  in	  which	  emotions	  are	  uncounted	  in	  art:	  works	  of	  art	  can	  be	  
pervaded	   by	   a	   distinct	   emotional	   flavor	   or	   tone	   […]	   the	  work’s	   emotional	   contour,	   its	  
emotional	  perspective,	  to	  cite	  to	  common	  metaphors».	  	  
In	  regard	  to	  the	  property,	  Intellectual	  Challenge,	  Dutton	  (2006)	  writes	  that	  «works	  of	  
art	   tend	   to	   be	   designed	   to	   utilize	   a	   combined	   variety	   of	   human	   perceptual	   and	  
intellectual	   capacities	   to	   a	   full	   extent;	   indeed,	   the	   best	   works	   stretch	   them	   beyond	  
ordinary	   limits.	   The	   full	   exercise	   of	   mental	   capacities	   is	   itself	   a	   source	   of	   aesthetic	  
pleasure	   […].The	   pleasure	   of	  meeting	   intellectual	   challenges	   is	  most	   obvious	   in	   vastly	  
complicated	  art,	   [but]	  even	   in	  works	   that	  are	  simple,	  on	  one	   level,	   such	  as	  Duchamp’s	  
readymades,	  may	  deny	  easy	  explanation	  and	  give	  pleasure	  in	  tracing	  out	  their	  complex	  
historic	  or	  interpretative	  dimensions»	  
Imaginative	  Experience,	  Dutton	   ([2006]:	  373)	  claims,	   is	  perhaps	   the	  most	   important	  
characteristic	  of	  art	  because	  it	  «decouples	  imagination	  from	  practical	  concerns,	  freeing	  
it,	  as	  Kant	  instructed,	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  logic	  and	  rational	  understanding».	  «Works	  
of	   art»,	   he	   continues,	   also	   borrowing	   from	   Kant,	   «are	   imaginative	   objects	   subject	   to	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disinterested	   contemplation».	   Logic	   and	   rational	   thinking,	   he	   argues,	   are	   constraints	  
limited	  by	  their	  association	  with	  the	  objective	  and	  the	  practical.	  He	  sees	  imagination	  as	  a	  
distinct	  mental	  activity,	  one	  that	  draws	  on	  emotion.	  
When	  describing	  the	  property	  Representation,	  Dutton	  ([2006]:	  371)	  writes	  that	  «art	  
objects,	  including	  sculptures,	  paintings,	  and	  oral	  and	  written	  narratives,	  and	  sometimes	  
even	  music,	   represent	  or	   imitate	   real	   and	   imaginary	  experiences	  of	   the	  world».	  While	  
representation	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   identifiable,	   he	   then	   turns	   his	   description	   of	  
representation	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   emotion,	   referring	   to	   Aristotle	   who	   observed	   that	  
«human	   beings	   take	   an	   irreducible	   pleasure	   in	   representation»	   (ibid.).	   We	   not	   only	  
experience	   pleasure,	   Dutton	   explains,	   in	   a	   realistic	   painting,	   «we	   can	   take	   pleasure	   in	  
how	  well	  a	  representation	  is	  accomplished	  and	  […]	  in	  the	  object	  or	  scene	  represented»	  
(ibid.).	   While	   representation	   is	   potentially	   identifiable,	   contemporary	   forms	   of	   art	   –	  
color	  field,	  for	  example	  –	  do	  not	  clearly	  represent	  anything.	  	  
Dutton	  also	  describes	  the	  property	  Skill	  and	  Virtuosity,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  easily	  
identifiable,	   in	   terms	   of	   emotion	   it	   arouses.	   He	   writes,	   «skill	   exercised	   by	   writers,	  
carvers,	  dancers,	  potters,	  composers,	  painters,	  pianists,	  and	  so	  forth	  can	  cause	   jaws	  to	  
drop,	   hair	   to	   stand	   up	   on	   the	   back	   of	   the	   neck,	   and	   eyes	   to	   flood	   with	   tears.	   The	  
demonstration	  of	  skill	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  deeply	  pleasurable	  aspects	  of	  art»	  (ivi:	  369).	  As	  
skill	  is,	  he	  admits,	  appreciated	  not	  just	  in	  art,	  but	  in	  many	  aspects	  of	  life,	  what	  is	  unique	  
about	  skill	  in	  art	  is	  the	  unique,	  aesthetic	  emotion	  that	  only	  occurs	  in	  response	  to	  seeing	  
that	  skill	  is	  exhibited	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  art.	  	  
When	   describing	   Skill	   or	   Virtuosity	   Dutton	  writes	   that	   the	  making	   of	   an	   «object	   or	  
performance	  requires	  and	  demonstrates	  the	  exercise	  of	  specialized	  skills»	  (ivi:	  369).	  He	  
goes	   on	   to	   make	   several	   claims	   that	   are	   potentially	   testable	   using	   the	   cross-­‐cultural	  
record.	  First,	  he	  writes	  that	  «these	  skills	  are	  learned	  in	  an	  apprentice	  tradition	  in	  some	  
societies	  or	  in	  others	  may	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  anyone	  who	  finds	  that	  she	  or	  he	  “has	  a	  knack”	  
for	  them»	  (ibid.).	  Second,	  he	  claims	  that	  skill	  is	  universally	  noticed	  and	  admired.	  A	  final	  
claim	   is	   that	   «Almost	   every	   regularized	   human	   activity	   can	   be	   turned	   competitive	   in	  
order	  to	  emphasize	  the	  development	  and	  admiration	  of	  its	  technical,	  skill	  aspect»	  (ibid.).	  
In	   other	   words,	   he	   recognizes	   that	   skill	   involves	   competition	   and	   admits	   that	   the	  
admiration	  of	  skill	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  art.	  We	  discuss	  these	  below.	  
Discussion:	  Are	  these	  properties	  identifiable	  by	  the	  senses?	  
The	  problem	  with	  emotion.	  The	  emotion	  most	  often	  said	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  making	  
and	  viewing	  art	  is	  pleasure,	  and	  while	  this	  is	  not	  the	  most	  important	  problem	  we	  face	  in	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using	  this	  property	   to	  define	  art,	  art	  also	  can	  be	  said	   to	  arouse	  grave	   feelings	  or	   leave	  
the	   viewer	   bewildered,	   confused,	   non-­‐plussed,	   unsure	   of	   any	   emotional	   reaction	  
(Anderson	   [1979]).	   Indeed,	   art	   can	   be	   said	   to	   arouse	   no	   emotions	   as	   it	   draws	   «no	  
aesthetic	  interest»	  (Brothwell	  [1976]).	  	  
An	  additional	  problem	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  actually	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
«aesthetic»	   emotion,	   associated	   solely	   with	   art.	   Dutton	   admits	   that	   the	   emotions	  
experienced	  with	   viewing	  art	   are	  not	  unlike	   those	   said	   to	  be	  aroused	  by	  other	   things.	  
When	  describing	  the	  property	  Direct	  Pleasure,	  for	  example,	  he	  admits	  that	  the	  emotion	  
derived	  from	  art	  […]»	  is	  familiar	  in	  many	  other	  areas	  of	  life,	  such	  as	  the	  pleasure	  of	  sport	  
and	  play,	  of	  quaffing	  a	  cold	  drink	  on	  a	  hot	  day,	  or	  of	  watching	  larks	  soar	  or	  storm	  clouds	  
thicken»	   (Dutton	   [2006]:	   369).	   When	   describing	   the	   property	   Skill	   and	   Virtuosity,	   he	  
writes,	  «High	  skill	  is	  a	  source	  of	  pleasure	  and	  admiration	  in	  every	  area	  of	  human	  activity	  
beyond	  art»	  (ibid.).	   In	  regard	  to	  Emotional	  Saturation,	  he	  writes,	  «Many	  ordinary,	  non-­‐
art	   life	   experiences	   –	   falling	   in	   love,	   watching	   a	   child	   take	   its	   first	   steps,	   attending	   a	  
funeral,	  seeing	  an	  athlete	  break	  a	  world	  record,	  a	  row	  with	  a	  close	  friend	  (ivi:	  372).	  	  
One	   of	   the	   two	   most	   important	   problems	   related	   to	   using	   emotion	   as	   a	   defining	  
property	  of	  art,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  readily	  identifiable.	  While	  we	  seem	  to	  
be	   approaching	   methods	   that	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   identify	   emotions	   –	   the	   release	   of	  
hormones	   associated	  with	   emotion	   or	   places	   in	   the	   brain	  where	   they	   occur	   –	   current	  
discussions	  of	  emotion	  rely	  on	  self-­‐report,	  which	  is	  a	  notoriously	  weak	  research	  method.	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   understand,	   however,	   that	   while	   subjective	   emotions	   should	   be	  
ignored	  in	  defining	  art	  scientifically,	  this	  does	  not	  indicate	  that	  emotion	  is	   irrelevant	  to	  
the	   study	   of	   art.	   I	   assume	   that	   art	   attracts	   us	   because	   it	   interests	   us,	   presumably	   by	  
provoking	   some	   physiological	   response	   in	   our	   brains,	   including	   responses	   commonly	  
referred	   to	  as	  emotion.	  However,	  even	   if	  we	  could	  demonstrate	   that	  an	  emotion,	  and	  
point	  out	  which	  emotion,	   is	   associated	  with	  art,	  we	   still	  would	   still	   have	   to	   show	   that	  
those	   emotions	   are	   universal	   and	   distinct	   from	   emotions	   aroused	   by	   other	   events.	  
Further,	  we	  still	  would	  have	  to	  identify	  precisely	  what	  arouses	  the	  aesthetic	  emotion	  –	  is	  
it	   aroused	   by	   the	   color,	   pattern,	   form,	   or	   technique,	   style,	   or	   by	   certain	   sounds	   or	  
movements,	  or	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  certain	  sounds	  and	  certain	  movements?	  	  
The	  most	   important	   problem	   that	  we	   face	  when	  with	   defining	   art	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
emotion	  it	  arouses,	  is	  that	  we	  are	  focusing	  on	  what	  art	  does	  –	  its	  effect	  or	  function	  of	  art	  
–	  not	  on	  what	  art	  is.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper,	  if	  we	  really	  wish	  to	  know	  what	  
art	  does,	  we	  first	  must	  know	  what	  art	  is.	  
Kathryn	  Coe,	  Can	  Science	  lead	  us	  to	  a	  Definition	  of	  Art?	  
pag.	  161	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  2/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	  
Turning	  now	  to	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  record	  and	  the	  universality	  of	  these	  properties,	  key	  
words	   such	   as	   art	   and	   emotion	   and	   aesthetic	   emotion	   were	   used	   to	   search	   the	   258	  
culture	   categories	   included	   in	   the	   Human	   Relations	   Area	   Files	   (HRAF).	   Aesthetic	  
appreciation	  is	  mentioned	  in	  only	  a	  few	  ethnographic	  studies	  and	  in	  those	  studies	  that	  
emotion	  was	  said	  to	  be	  aroused	  not	  by	  art,	  but	  by	  rituals.	  Among	  the	  modern	  Greeks,	  
for	   example,	   aesthetic	   appreciation	   was	   said	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   rites	   of	   passage,	  
including	  funerals	  and	  marriages	  (Herzfeld	  [1993]).	  As	  the	  term	  aesthetic	  is	  one	  that	  may	  
not	  commonly	  be	  used	  by	  ethnographers,	  the	  terms	  «emotion	  and	  art»	  were	  also	  used	  
in	   a	   search.	   Again,	   these	   terms	   also	   pulled	   up	   descriptions	   of	   rituals;	   Speck	   writes	  
([1935]:	  193),	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  function	  of	  the	  quasi-­‐ritualistic	  games	  played	  by	  the	  
Naskapi	   hunters	   of	   the	   Labrador	   Peninsula	   is	   «comparable	   to	   that	   of	   decorative	   art,	  
since	  the	  emotional	  pleasures	  of	  the	  arts	  stand	  forth	  as	  nourishment	  to	  the	  soul».	  Speck	  
admits	   that	   he	  might	   be	   accused	   of	   telling	   the	   reader	   what	   Naskapi	   thinks	   (ivi:	   193).	  
While	  he	  denies	  the	  possibility,	  he	  provides	  no	  solid	  evidence	  to	  back	  up	  his	  claim.	  This	  
discussion,	  however,	  points	  out	  an	  interesting	  feature	  of	  much	  of	  the	  ethnographic	  data.	  
The	  thoughts,	  beliefs,	  and	  emotions	  of	  the	  people	  being	  studied	  are	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  
anthropologist’s	   interpretation.	  Any	   subjective	   emotions	   underlying	   these	  behaviors	   is	  
merely	   hypothetical,	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   ethnographer	   (Rappaport	   [1999];	   Steadman,	  
Palmer	  [2008]).	  
Before	  we	  leave	  this	  discussion,	  the	  reader	  should	  note	  that	  the	  descriptions	  focusing	  
on	  non-­‐verifiable	  properties	  –	  emotion	  &	   intellect	  –	  are	   likely	   to	   lack	  clarity	  are	   those,	  
such	  as	  emotion	  and	   intellect.	  Even	   though	  artists	  and	  art	  critics	  are	  comfortable	  with	  
such	   terminology,	   it	   generally	   falls	   into	   the	   humanities	   or,	   the	   quasi-­‐art-­‐quasi-­‐science	  
category	  (Zald	  [1991]).	  A	  small	  poll	  of	  twenty	  studio	  artists	  and	  art	  historians	  regarding	  
Dutton’s	   discussion	   of	   Emotional	   Saturation	   indicated	   that	   they	   felt	   that	   they	  
understood	  the	  meaning.	  When	  asked	  to	  explain	  what	  he	  meant,	  however,	  the	  majority	  
was	  at	  a	  loss	  for	  words.	  One	  participant	  (personal	  communication,	  September	  27,	  2011),	  
who	   bravely	   attempted	   to	   explain	   it,	   wrote:	   «”Science”	   relies	   on	   left-­‐hemisphere	  
analytic	   type	  of	   thinking.	   There’s	   a	  whole	   other	   hemisphere	   that	   perceives	   the	  world,	  
but	   it	   is	   mute	   and	   its	   perceptions	   are	   disregarded	   by	   the	   rational,	   analytic	   left	  
hemisphere.	   A	   poem	  does	   not	   "mean"	  what	   it	   says	   if	   one	  were	   to	   reword	   it	   in	   "plain	  
language".	   It	   is	   the	   "tone"	   that	   the	   whole	   generates,	   apart	   from	   the	   semantic	  
"meaning",	  that	  Denis	  is	  talking	  about	  here,	  I	  think».	  
This	  description	  concluded:	  «I	  don’t	  think	  that	  Denis	  is	  a	  scientist	  nor	  does	  he	  try	  to	  
be».	  While	  the	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  he	  should	  not	  be	  held	  to	  standards	  of	  clarity,	  as	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Dutton	  himself	  recognized	  (1995),	  social	  scientists	  should	  «defy	  and	  eschew	  the	  jargon	  
and	  willful	   obscurity	  which	   so	   often	   replaces	   hard	   thinking	   in	   theoretical	  writing»	   (ivi:	  
43).	   What	   both	   Dutton	   and	   this	   participant	   may	   be	   trying	   to	   communicate	   is	   that	  
Emotional	   Saturation	   involves	   elements	   of	   what	   we	   might	   call	   absorption,	   meaning,	  
perhaps,	  that	  our	  entire	  attention	  is	  captured	  and	  held,	  perhaps	  involuntarily	  (see	  Rader	  
[1974]:	  131;	  Rowe	  [1991]:	  274).	  This	  could	  be	  a	  testable	  proposition.	  Although	  we	  value	  
literary	  eloquence,	  we	  agree	  with	  Bruner	  ([2002]:	  5)	  that	  «too	  good	  a	  story	  is	  somehow	  
not	  to	  be	  trusted».	  As	  Einstein	  explained,	  we	  «must	  look	  at	  substance	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  
form»	  (Einstein	  [1956]:	  23)	  and	  "If	  you	  are	  out	  to	  describe	  the	  truth,	   leave	  elegance	  to	  
the	  tailor"	  (Einstein,	  cited	  in	  Harriger	  [2009]:	  ix).	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  Skill:	   I	  wish	  to	  take	  a	  moment	  to	  resurrect	  the	  property	  skill,	  as	  it	  
can	  be	  defined	   in	  ways	   that	  make	   it	   identifiable.	   In	   regard	  to	  Dutton’s	  claim	  that	  skills	  
are	   acquired	   in	   apprentice	   programs	   or	   picked	   up	   by	   anyone	  who	   «has	   a	   knack»,	   the	  
evidence	   supports	   that	   in	   small-­‐scale	   kinship-­‐based	   societies,	   older	   adults	   were	  
responsible	   for	   teaching	  art	   techniques	  and	  motifs	   to	  their	  young	  kin.	  Craft	  apprentice	  
programs	   in	  Africa	  were	   initiated	  after	   the	  art	  began	  to	  be	  sold	   in	  a	  market	  place,	  not	  
made	  for	  family	  use	  (see	  Lave,	  Wenger	  [1991]).	  An	  important	  difference	  between	  these	  
two	  types	  of	  learning	  is	  that	  in	  an	  apprenticeship	  program,	  the	  apprentice	  often	  goes	  on	  
to	   compete	  with	  his	  mentor/teacher,	  whereas	   in	   traditional	   kinship	   societies,	   children	  
not	  only	  continue	  to	  practice	  the	  skills	  and	  motifs	  they	  learn,	  but	  they	  go	  on	  to	  teach	  the	  
same	  skills	  to	  their	  own	  children	  (who	  then	  teach	  them	  to	  theirs),	  and	  the	  teacher	  and	  
the	  student	  do	  not	  compete	  (Coe	  [2003]).	  	  
In	  regard	  to	  Dutton’s	  claim	  that	  skill	  is	  universally	  admired,	  skill	  also	  can	  be	  resented.	  
This	   resentment,	   and	   the	   social	   problems	   it	   can	   cause,	   were	   pointed	   out	   in	   an	  
anonymous	   article	   published	   in	   The	   Musical	   Times	   in	   1895,	   which	   described	   how,	   in	  
Greek	  mythology,	  Marsyas	  challenged	  Apollo	  to	  a	  trial	  of	  skill	  as	  a	  musician.	  Apollo	  won	  
the	  trial,	  although	  his	  «victory	  long	  hung	  in	  the	  balance»	  (653).	  Apollo,	  however,	  was	  not	  
satisfied	  with	   this	   success;	   he	   quickly	   seized	   his	   unfortunate	   antagonist,	   tied	   him	   to	   a	  
tree	  and	  flayed	  him	  alive.	  Giorgio	  Vasari,	  an	  artist	  as	  well	  as	  a	  biographer,	  was	  startled	  
by	   a	   climate	   of	   intense	   rivalry	   among	   Renaissance	   artists	   (Goffen	   [2004]).	   Rivalry	  
between	   the	   architects	   Bernini	   and	   Borromini,	   Morrissey	   (2005)	   writes,	   was	   very	  
acrimonious,	   involving	   struggles,	   heartaches,	   backroom	   dealings,	   betrayals,	   assaults,	  
murder	   and	   suicide.	   Coe	   (2003)	   argues	   that	   in	   traditional	   social	   environments,	  
constraints	   were	   placed	   on	   the	   demonstration	   of	   skill,	   to	   the	   point	   it	   became	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competitive,	   as	   such	   competition	   causes	   resentment,	   which	   damages	   critically	  
important	  social	  relationships.	  	  
The	  remaining	  properties	  	  
While	  none	  of	  Dutton’s	  properties	  are	  truly	  discrete	  categories,	  the	  remaining	  ones	  are	  
particularly	  so.	  The	  property	  Criticism,	  for	  example,	  is	  closely	  tied	  to,	  and	  used	  to	  explain	  
Skill.	  Expressive	  Individuality	   is	   linked	  with	  Creativity	  and	  Novelty	  and	  Skill.	  Further,	  the	  
property	   Style	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   Art	   Traditions	   and	   Institutions.	   Because	   these	  
properties	   are	   overlapping,	   and	   some	   are	   often	   assumed	   to	   be	   opposites	   –	   traditions	  
and	  creativity,	   for	  example	  –	  they	  will	  be	  discussed	  together.	  This	  discussion	  begins	  by	  
focusing	   on	   the	   property	   Special	   Focus,	   as	   it	   may	   link,	   in	   an	   important	   sense,	   all	   the	  
properties,	  and	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	   these	  properties	  –	  and	  art	  –	  only	  can	  be	  evaluated	  
and	  their	  importance	  identified	  if	  we	  first	  understand	  the	  distinction	  between	  traditional	  
and	  non-­‐traditional.	  	  
Dutton	  ([2006]:	  371)	  distinguishes	  two	  ways	  that	  Special	  Focus	  manifests	  itself.	  First,	  
he	  writes	   that	   «works	   of	   art	   and	   artistic	   performances	   tend	   to	   be	   bracketed	   off	   from	  
ordinary	   life,	   made	   a	   separate	   and	   dramatic	   focus	   of	   experience».	   «In	   every	   known	  
culture»,	  he	  continues,	  art	  involves	  what	  Ellen	  Dissanayake	  calls	  «making	  special»,	  which	  
can	   include:	   «A	   gold-­‐curtained	   stage,	   a	   plinth,	   spotlights,	   ornate	   picture	   frames,	  
illuminated	   showcases,	   book	   jackets	   and	   typography,	   ceremonial	   aspects	   of	   public	  
concerns	   and	   plays,	   an	   audience’s	   expensive	   clothes,	   the	   performer’s	   black	   tie,	   the	  
present	  of	  the	  Czar	   in	  his	  royal	  box,	  even	  the	  high	  price	  of	  tickets:	  these	  and	  countless	  
other	  factors	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  sense	  the	  work	  of	  art,	  or	  artistic	  event,	  is	  an	  object	  of	  
singular	   attention,	   to	   be	   appreciated	   as	   something	   out	   of	   the	   mundane	   stream	   of	  
experience	  end	  activity».	  	  
He	  then	  maintains	  that	  it	   is	  «the	  nature	  of	  art	   itself	  to	  demand	  particular	  attention.	  
Although	  some	  works	  of	  artistic	  value	  –	  for	  instance,	  wallpaper	  or	  mood-­‐inducing	  music	  
–	  can	  be	  used	  as	  background,	  all	  cultures	  know	  and	  appreciate	  special,	  «foregrounded	  
art»	  (ivi:	  371).	  He	  concludes	  by	  admitting	  that	  any	  «isolate-­‐able	  episode,	  artistic	  or	  not,	  
that	   can	   be	   said	   to	   possess	   a	   recognizable	   “theatrical”	   element	   shares	   something	   in	  
common	   with	   […]	   almost	   all	   art.	   As	   examples,	   he	   mentions	   rollercoaster	   rides	   and	  
presidential	  inaugurations.	  	  
Dutton’s	   discussion	   is	   difficult	   to	   follow.	   He	   does	   not	   explain	   what	   «foregrounded	  
art»	  is;	  he	  does	  not	  make	  it	  clear	  if	  or	  how	  making	  special	  in	  art	  might	  be	  different	  from	  
adding,	   for	   example,	   developing	   a	   special	   new	   gizmo	   for	   a	   vacuum	   cleaner;	   and	   he	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moves	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   art	   and	   ritual	   –	  while	   art	  may	   be	   incorporated	   into	   a	  
ritual,	  a	  ritual	  is	  a	  separate	  behavior,	  or	  set	  of	  behaviors,	  involving	  more	  than	  just	  art.	  	  
While	   Dissanayake	   acknowledges	   the	   problems	   with	   «making	   special»	   –	   she	  
describes	   it	   as	   «shaping	   and	   embellishing	   everyday	   ordinary	   reality	   so	   it	   becomes	  
extraordinary»	  (Dissanayake	  [1988]:	  148).	  As	  Flannery	  ([1993]:	  498)	  explains,	  it	  involves	  
«treating	   something	   different	   as	   from	   everyday».	  We	   treat	   many	   things	   differently	   –	  
dogs	   and	   criminals	   –	   for	   example.	   It	   seems	   difficult	   to	   isolate	   what	   «making	   special»	  
actually	  may	  involve,	  other	  than	  making	  something	  more	  noticeable.	  While	  it	  is	  doubtful	  
that	   artists	  will	   say	   that	   they	  want	   to	  make	   something	   special,	   they	   generally	   are	   not	  
averse	  to	  attracting	  attention.	  The	  issue,	  thus,	  is	  how	  «making	  special»	  is	  different	  from	  
making	  something	  attractive?	  «Attract»	  comes	  from	  the	  Latin	  word	  attractus,	  meaning	  
to	  draw,	  or	  to	  cause	  to	  approach	  or	  adhere	  to.	  Attract	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  object	  or	  
event	  draws	  positive	  attention.	  The	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  visual	  art	  is	  that	  it	  is	  noticeable	  (Coe	  
[2003]).	  Once	  we	   focus	  on	   the	  property	  attract,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  natural	   things	   in	  our	  
world	  attract	  and	  hold	  our	  attention	  (e.g.,	  rainbows,	  soaring	  birds,	  certain	  sequences	  of	  
sound),	  how	  does	  art	   incorporate	   those	  properties,	  and	  does	   it	  necessarily	   follow	  that	  
when	  these	  properties	  are	  used	  in	  art,	  they	  somehow	  assume	  a	  uniqueness,	  arousing	  a	  
unique	  emotion?	  	  
An	   additional	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   basis	   of	  making	   special	   is	   said	   to	   be	   creativity	   –	  
which,	   Dissanayake	   argues,	   is	   a	   biological	   need	   (1998).	   While	   many	   would	   agree,	  
creativity	  is	  associated	  with	  change,	  which	  is	  not	  evident	  in	  the	  ethnographic	  and	  much	  
of	  the	  historical	  record.	  As	  Bernard	  Berenson	  wrote	  ([1948]:	  155),	  a	  «lust	  for	  newness»,	  
is	  neither	  ancient	  nor	  universal.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  topic;	  however,	  as	  persistence	  is	  
the	  characteristic	  seen	  in	  early	  forms	  of	  art,	  and	  as	  art	  objects	  and	  traditions	  can	  last	  for	  
hundreds	   and	   even	   thousands	   of	   years	   –	   and	   are,	   in	   the	   span	   of	   a	   person’s	   life,	   seen	  
daily	  until	   they	  become	  a	  commonplace	  part	  of	  the	  environment	  –	  do	  we	  assume	  that	  
they	  no	  longer	  are	  art?	  	  
The	   remaining	  properties	  also	   involve	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	   traditional	  and	  
non-­‐traditional.	   Novelty	   and	   Creativity	   and	   Expressive	   Individuality	   both	   focus	   on	  
creativity,	   which	   according	   to	   Dutton,	   is	   «the	   locus	   of	   individuality	   or	   genius	   of	   art»	  
(Dutton	  [2006]:	  370).	  Art	  Traditions	  and	  Institutions	  and	  Style,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  focus	  
on	   what	   seems	   contradictory,	   or	   perhaps	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   coin,	   replication	   and	  
predictability.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   we	   begin	   the	   next	   section	   by,	   first,	   discussing	   the	  
remaining	  properties,	  as	  described	  by	  Dutton,	  and	  then	  review	  the	  difference	  between	  
traditional	  and	  creative	  or	  non-­‐traditional.	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Description:	  The	  issue	  of	  traditional	  and	  non-­‐traditional	  
While	  Dutton	  does	  not	   spend	  much	   time	  discussing	  Art	   Traditions	  and	   Institutions,	   he	  
does	  write	  that	  «Art	  objects	  and	  performances,	  as	  much	  in	  small-­‐scale	  oral	  cultures	  as	  in	  
literate	  civilizations,	  are	  created	  and	  to	  a	  degree	  given	  significance	  by	  their	  place	  in	  the	  
history	   and	   traditions	   of	   their	   art»	   (Dutton	   [2006]:	   372).	   This	   characteristic,	   Dutton,	  
explains,	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   virtually	   all	   organized	   social	   activities	   –	   from	  medicine,	   to	  
politics,	  to	  science	  –	  as	  they	  are	  built	  on	  a	  backdrop	  of	  customs	  and	  demands,	  historical	  
and	  institutional	  traditions.	  	  
Dutton,	  when	  discussing	  Criticism	  (which,	  curiously,	  is	  not	  a	  characteristic	  of	  art,	  but,	  
a	  hypothetical	  response	  to	  art),	  argues	  that	  wherever	  artistic	  forms	  are	  found	  they	  exist	  
alongside	  some	  kind	  of	  critical	   language	  of	   judgment	  and	  appreciation	   (Dutton	   [2006]:	  
370).	  While	  there	  is,	  he	  argues,	  «wide	  variation	  across	  and	  within	  cultures	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	   complexity	   of	   criticism»,	   he	   recognizes	   that	   anthropologists	   have	   repeatedly	  
commented	  «on	  its	  rudimentary	  development	  or	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  near	  non-­‐existence	  
in	  small,	  nonliterate	  societies	  […]»	  	  
Expressive	   Individuality,	  Dutton	  ([2006]:	  371)	  writes,	  seems	  to	   inevitably	  arise.	  Even	  
in	  cultures	  that	  produce	  what	  Dutton	  calls	  «less	  personalized	  art»	  (ibid.),	  which	  seems	  to	  
mean	   that	   they	   maintain	   art	   traditions	   with	   significant	   fidelity,	   «individuality,	   as	  
opposed	  to	  competent	  execution»	  still	   can	  «be	  the	   focus	  of	  attention	  and	  evaluation»	  
(Dutton	   [2006]:	   317).	   «The	   claim	   that	   artistic	   individuality	   is	   a	  Western	   construct	   not	  
found	  in	  non-­‐Western	  and	  tribal	  cultures»,	  he	  argues»,	  has	  been	  widely	  accepted	  and	  is	  
certainly	   false»	   [our	   emphasis].	   In	   support	   of	   this	   claim,	   he	   points	   out	   that	   in	   New	  
Guinea,	   traditional	  carvings	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  signed	  because	  everyone	  already	  knew	  
which	   carver	   produced	   which	   work.	   He	   interprets	   this	   to	   mean	   that	   «expressive	  
personality	  is	  respected	  in	  New	  Guinea	  as	  elsewhere»	  (Dutton	  [2006]:371).	  
	  When	   writing	   about	   Novelty	   and	   Creativity,	   Dutton	   ([2006]:	   370)	   claims	   that	  
«novelty,	  creativity,	  originality	  and	  capacity	  to	  surprise	  its	  audience»	  are	  highly	  valued	  in	  
art	  and	  that	  the	  «persistent	  pursuit	  of	  creativity»	  characterizes	  humans	  across	  cultures	  
not	  just	  in	  art,	  but	  in	  a	  great	  many	  areas	  of	  human	  endeavor».	  Dutton	  (2006)	  recognizes	  
that	   creativity,	   objectively,	   refers	   to	   newness,	   to	   an	   identifiable	   change	   in	   materials,	  
technique,	  motif,	  and	  theme.	  Their	  importance,	  he	  argues,	  lies	  in	  the	  attention-­‐grabbing	  
function	  of	  art,	  which	  he	  feels	  is	  a	  major	  component	  of	  its	  entertainment	  value.	  	  
The	   following	   testable	   claims	   follow	   from	   his	   discussion:	   «[…]	   novelty,	   creativity,	  
originality	   and	   capacity	   to	   surprise	   its	   audience»	   are	   highly	   valued	   in	   art	   and	   that	   the	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«persistent	   pursuit	   of	   creativity»	   characterizes	   humans	   across	   cultures	   not	   just	   in	   art,	  
but	   in	   a	   great	  many	  areas	  of	   human	  endeavor»	   (Dutton	   [2006]:	   370).	   «The	   claim	   that	  
artistic	  individuality	  is	  a	  Western	  construct	  not	  found	  in	  non-­‐Western	  and	  tribal	  cultures,	  
has	  been	  widely	  accepted	  and	  is	  certainly	  false»	  (Dutton	  [2006]:	  371;	  our	  emphasis).	  He	  
goes	  on	   to	   claim	   that	   «rigidity	   or	   fluid	   adaptability	   of	   styles	   can	   vary	   as	  much	   in	  non-­‐
Western	  and	  tribal	  cultures	  as	  in	  the	  histories	  of	  literate	  civilizations;	  for	  example,	  some	  
sacred	  objects	  and	  performances	  are	  tightly	  circumscribed	  by	  tradition	  (as	  in	  older	  styles	  
of	   Pueblo	   pottery),	   with	   others	   open	   to	   free,	   creative,	   individualistic	   interpretive	  
variation»	  (Dutton	  [2006]:	  370).	  
Wherever	  artistic	  forms	  are	  found	  they	  exist	  alongside	  some	  kind	  of	  critical	  language	  
of	  judgment	  and	  appreciation	  (Dutton	  [2006]:	  370).	  
Art	   objects	   and	   performances,	   as	   much	   in	   small-­‐scale	   oral	   cultures	   as	   in	   literate	  
civilizations,	  are	  created	  and	  to	  a	  degree	  given	  significance	  by	  their	  place	  in	  the	  history	  
and	  traditions	  of	  their	  art»	  (Dutton	  [2006]:	  371).	  
Discussion:	  The	  Issue	  of	  Traditional	  and	  Non-­‐Traditional	  
Creativity	  and	  Individualism.	  Many,	  perhaps	  most,	  current	  art	  scholars	  would	  agree	  that	  
creativity	  is	  a	  necessary	  element	  of	  art	  (Joyce	  [1975])	  and	  is	  a	  human	  need	  that	  is	  valued	  
across	   cultures	   (Dissanayake	   [1992]:	   82).	   A	   problem	   here	   is	   that	   creativity	   implies	  
change	   and	   early	   anthropologists	   were	   in	   agreement	   that	   the	   societies	   they	   studied	  
were	   characterized	   by	   persistence,	   not	   change.	   In	   both	   art	   history	   and	   anthropology	  
there	   is	   clear	   evidence	   supporting	   that	   in	   traditional	   societies,	   creativity	   while	   not	  
stifled,	   was	   significantly	   limited.	   M.	   G.	   Houston	   ([1920]:	   2)	   described	   traditional	   art,	  
writing,	  «we	  are	  confronted	  with	  an	  extraordinary	  conservation	  or	  persistence	  of	  style,	  
not	  only	  through	  the	  centuries,	  but	  through	  millenniums	  [sic]».	  A	  focus	  of	  studies	  done	  
by	  Boas	  ([1955]:	  144,	  169)	  was	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  «fixed	  type»	  or	  «fixity»	  of	  design	  
and	  form.	  Gombrich	  ([1972]:	  119),	  an	  art	  historian,	  argued	  that	  «our	  modern	  notion	  that	  
an	   artist	  must	   be	   “original”,	  was	   by	   no	  means	   shared	   by	  most	   people	   in	   the	   past.	   An	  
Egyptian,	  a	  Chinese,	  or	  a	  Byzantine	  master	  would	  have	  been	  greatly	  puzzled	  by	  such	  a	  
demand.	   Nor	   would	   a	   medieval	   artist	   of	   Western	   Europe	   have	   understood	   why	   he	  
should	   invent	  new	  ways	  of	  planning	  a	  church,	  a	  designing	  a	  chalice,	  or	  of	  representing	  
the	  sacred	  story	  when	  the	  old	  ones	  served	  the	  purpose	  so	  well».	  	  
In	  his	  book	  Aesthetics	  and	  History,	  Bernard	  Berenson	  ([1948]:	  155)	  wrote	  that	  «The	  
lust	  for	  otherness,	  for	  newness,	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  most	  natural	  and	  matter-­‐of-­‐course	  
thing	  in	  the	  world;	  however,	  «prehistoric	  races	  are	  credited	  with	  having	  had	  so	  little	  of	  it	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that	   a	   change	   in	   artifacts	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   a	   change	   in	   populations,	   one	   following	  
another.	  The	  same	  holds	  for	  the	  peoples	  of	  relatively	  recent	  or	  quite	  recent	  date	  like	  the	  
Peruvians	   and	   the	  Mayas	   and	   Aztecs	   as	   well	   as	   the	   African	   and	   Oceanic	   tribes.	   Even	  
people	  so	  civilized	  as	  the	  Egyptians	  changed	  so	  little	  in	  three	  thousand	  years	  that	  it	  takes	  
training	  to	  distinguish	  a	  Saitic	  sculpture	  from	  one	  of	  the	  early	  dynasties.	  In	  Mesopotamia	  
also	  change	  was	  slow.	  But	   for	  Alexander’s	  conquest,	   there	  might	  have	  been	  almost	  no	  
newness	  in	  India,	  and	  but	  for	  the	  Buddhist	  missionaries	  as	  little	  in	  China.	  Why	  was	  there	  
so	  little	  craving	  for	  novelty	  everywhere	  on	  earth?».	  
The	  persistence	  of	   techniques,	  motifs,	  etc.	   is	  holistically	   related	   to	   the	   role	   that	  art	  
played	  in	  everyday	  life,	  in	  rituals,	  in	  religion	  and	  in	  social	  rules.	  Art,	  stories	  in	  particular,	  
was	   used	   to	   teach	   the	   social	   rules	   that	   specified	   such	   things	   as	   who	   could	   use	   what	  
designs;	   who	   could	   perform	   what	   dances	   and	   when;	   who	   could	   tell	   stories,	   and	   to	  
whom;	  who	   could	   sing	   song,	   what	   songs,	   and	  when;	   and	  who	   should	   teach	   and	  who	  
should	  learn.	  	  
Change	   and	   creativity	   began	   to	   appear	  when	   there	  was	   contact	   between	   different	  
people	   with	   different	   ancestors.	   Bunzel,	   who	   studied	   potters	   and	   basket	   weavers	   in	  
Pueblo	  villages,	  whose	  work	  was	  now	  being	  purchased	  by	  tourists	  and	  collectors,	  found	  
that	  the	  potters	  and	  basket	  weavers	  began	  to	  place	  only	  a	  small	  degree	  of	  emphasis	  on	  
originality	   and	   individualism	   ([1928]:	   62-­‐68)	   and	   that	  major	   or	   radical	   innovation	  was	  
rare.	   In	   Africa,	   Bascom	   (1969)	   observed	   that	   radical	   innovations	  were	   unusual.	   In	   the	  
Sepik,	  changes	  in	  art	  began	  to	  occur	  when	  education	  was	  introduced	  and	  the	  carver’s	  art	  
began	  to	  be	  taught	  in	  school	  because,	  Guiart	  ([1969]:	  89)	  explained,	  «interested	  parties	  
[began]	   flying	   into	   Anggoram	   every	   week	   and	   with	   every	   crocodile-­‐skin	   buyer	   having	  
become	   a	   deal	   in	   primitive	   art».	   Creativity	   reached	   its	   zenith	   during	   the	   20th	   century,	  
when	   avant-­‐garde	   and	   modern	   art	   began	   to	   be	   built	   on	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	  
techniques	  and	   themes	  of	   traditional	   visual	   art.	  Men	   like	  Edward	  Stiegliz	   and	  Clement	  
Greenberg	  dismissed	   traditional	  art,	  even	  paintings	   that	  previously	  had	  been	   regarded	  
as	  great	  works.	  Soon,	  the	  younger	  generations	  of	  20th	  century	  artists,	  Seligman	  ([1952]:	  
57)	  explained,	  rejected	  all	  the	  work	  of	  the	  prior	  generations.	  
Criticism.	  Although	  criticism	   is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  art,	   the	  cross-­‐cultural	   record	  provides	  
some	   support	   for	   Dutton’s	   claim.	  While	   the	   Kalabari,	   as	   one	   example,	   do	   not	   place	   a	  
strong	  emphasis	  on	  criticism,	  among	  the	  Fang,	  Fernandez	  (1966)	  writes,	  there	  is	  a	  «lively	  
spirit	  of	  criticism»	  in	  evaluating	  the	  work	  of	  carvers.	  A	  carver	  who	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  this	  
criticism,	  would	  «retreat	  «to	  the	  solitude	  of	  the	  banana	  plantation	  behind	  the	  village	  […]	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[although	   he]	   cannot	   expect	   to	   escape	   his	   critics	   when	   the	   statue	   is	   completed»	  
(Fernandez	  [1966]:	  54).	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  carving	  is	  criticized,	  however,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  
affect	  the	  value	  of	  the	  carving;	  «it	  is	  a	  curious	  fact»,	  he	  wrote,	  that	  I	  never	  found	  a	  case	  
in	  which	  a	  statue	  was	  refused.	  The	  view	  seems	  to	  prevail	   that	  any	  statue	  can	  serve	   its	  
function	  atop	  the	  reliquary	  whether	  it	  is	  aesthetically	  satisfying	  or	  not»	  (p.	  55).	  Despite	  
this	  presumed	  «enthusiasm»	   for	  art	   criticism,	   the	  Fang	  never	   criticized	   sacred	  objects,	  
which	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  criticism	  or	  «aesthetic	  judgment»	  (p.	  55-­‐56).	  Similarly,	  among	  
the	  Lega,	  all	   sacred	  objects,	  were	  consistently	  evaluated	  as	  good.	  As	  Biebuyck	   ([1969]:	  
17)	   explained:	  «all	  pieces	   commissioned	   by	   the	  members	   of	   the	  bwami	   association	   –	  
who	   have	   the	   exclusive	   control	   over	   the	   art	  work	   –	   are	  good.	   That	  means	   they	   fulfill	  
their	  purposes	  and	  functions.	  Criticism	  of	  the	  physical	  appearances	  of	  such	  objects	  is	  not	  
tolerated;	  or	  rather,	  such	  criticism	  is	  inconceivable	  from	  their	  point	  of	  view».	  
This	   supports	   Layton	   ([1991]:	   11)	   claim	   that	   «aesthetic	   values	   are	   not	   universally	  
expressed	  […]	  but	  are	  rather	  specific	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  culture».	  
In	  regard	  to	  the	  format	  and	  language	  style	  of	  art	  criticism,	  Congdon	  (1989)	  points	  out	  
that	  each	  culture	  group	  may	  have	  different	  criticism	  formats	  and	  language	  styles.	  Bunzel	  
([1928]:	  570)	  notes	  that	  in	  evaluating	  pottery	  vessels,	  Hopi	  potters	  always	  spoke	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  line,	  the	  Zuni	  potters	  of	  the	  number	  and	  distribution	  of	  designs,	  and	  the	  
San	   Ildefonso	  potters	  of	   the	  surface	  texture	  and	  the	   luster.	   In	  Polynesia	   the	  value	  of	  a	  
drum	  was	   determined	   by	   its	   shape	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  wood	   (Guiart	   [1963]:	   112).	  
Biebuyck	  ([1969]:	  14)	  claimed	  that	  among	  the	  Lega	  of	  the	  Congo,	  critical	  attention	  was	  
focused,	  «first	  on	   the	  size,	  material,	  and	  gloss	  of	  a	  piece,	  and	  only	   then	  on	   its	  general	  
form	   and	   design».	   He	   concluded	   that	   «it	   is	   very	   likely	   that	   for	   these	   features	   of	   the	  
artwork	   on	   which	   the	   main	   aesthetic	   and	   function	   status	   rests,	   the	   rules	   are	   more	  
stringent	   than	   for	   other,	   secondary	  qualities.	  Allowances	   are	  made	   for	   the	  position	  of	  
the	  artist	  –	  is	  the	  artist	  just	  an	  apprentice,	  is	  this	  a	  first	  completed	  work	  of	  art?».	  
Further	   indicating	   that	   skill	   is	   not	   always	   evaluated,	   or	   that	   the	   criticism	   was	  
tempered,	   a	   crudely	   made	   object	   could	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   art.	   Lack	   of	   criticism	   and	  
tempered	  evaluation	  are	  characteristic	  of	  traditional	  people.	  The	  important	  point	  here,	  
as	  discussed	  before,	  is	  that	  humans	  are	  a	  highly	  social	  species;	  social	  relationships	  are	  of	  
critical	   importance	   and,	   throughout	   evolutionary	  history	   contributed	   to	  our	   ancestors’	  
ability	   to	   survive;	   thrive;	   and	   produce,	   nurture	   and	   protect	   families.	   Despite	   their	  
importance,	  conflict	  is	  difficult	  for	  us	  to	  avoid	  (McCullough,	  Tabak	  [2010]).	  Yet,	  given	  the	  
complex	  nature	  of	  human	  social	  ties	   in	  ethnic	  groups,	  even	  simple	  conflicts	  could	  have	  
serious,	   far-­‐reaching,	   and	   multigenerational	   effects.	   As	   criticism	   is	   often	   a	   cause	   of	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conflict,	  social	  rules	  limited	  the	  opportunities	  and	  tempered	  the	  degree	  of	  criticism	  that	  
was	  socially	  acceptable	  (Coe	  [2003]).	  	  
The	  Issue	  of	  Traditional	  and	  Creative/Non-­‐Traditional.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  «traditional»	  
and	   «traditional	   society»	   implies	   that	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   the	   seeming	   chaos	   of	   cultural	  
diversity	   in	   the	  world,	   there	   exists	   a	   recognizable	   dichotomy	   between	   traditional	   and	  
nontraditional	   societies.	   Although	   this	   dichotomy	   is	   actually	   a	   continuum,	   traditional	  
societies	   are	   those	   in	   which	   cultural	   behaviors	   have	   been	   copied	   from	   ancestors	   for	  
many	   generations;	   traditional	   behaviors,	   to	   quote	   Osaghae	   ([2010]:	   204),	   are	   «the	  
legacy	   of	   the	   past».	   These	   copied	   behaviors	   included	   not	   only	   the	   art,	   which	   shows	  
astonishing	   persistence,	   but	   rituals	   that	   are	   recognized	   as	   being	   stereotyped	   and	  
repeated	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  everyday	  behaviors	  related	  to	  
subsistence,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   social	   interaction.	   These	   traditions	   provided	   a	  
blueprint	   that	   gave	   individuals	   a	  model	   for	  how	   to	   live	   life	   and	  who	   should	   teach	  and	  
who	  should	  learn	  song,	  dance,	  art	  movements,	  sounds,	  motifs	  and	  techniques;	  how	  and	  
when	  to	  make	  or	  perform	  specific	  kinds	  of	  art,	  and	  the	  tempering	  of	  art’s	  competitive	  
elements.	  Traditions	  encouraged	  the	  replication	  of	  ancestral	  songs,	  dances,	  and	  plastic	  
art.	  	  
In	  tribes	  and	  subcategories	  of	  tribes	  –	  clans,	  subsections,	  phratries,	  moieties	  –	  rights	  
to	  particular	  techniques	  and	  design	  motifs	  are	  inherited,	  passed	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  
the	   next	   in	   a	   line	   descending	   from	   a	   particular	   ancestor.	   Morphy	   ([1991]:	   60-­‐63)	  
describes	  how	  subgroup	  affiliation	  is	  the	  way	  a	  man	  «obtains	  rights	  to	  produce	  his	  clan’s	  
paintings».	  Among	  the	  Gadjari,	  Meggitt	  ([1965]:	  228)	  writes	  that	  «The	  usual	  patrimoiety	  
rules	  determine	  the	  manufacture	  of	  Gadjari	  headdresses	  and	  temporary	  ritual	  objects».	  
Style,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  traditional	  societies,	  refers	  to	  designs	  and	  techniques	  inherited	  from	  
a	  common	  ancestor	  and	  shared	  by	   individuals	  who	  are	  co-­‐descendants.	  Whether	  done	  
intentionally	  or	  not,	   individuals	  are	  using	  visual	  art	   to	  communicate	  their	  ancestry	  and	  
their	  relationship	  to	  others	  with	  whom	  they	  share	  that	  ancestor.	  
Ancestral	   images	  –	  whether	  depicting	  ancestors	  or	   copying	   their	   art	  –	  guided	  what	  
was	   produced.	   Stuart	   (1988)	   explains	   that	   in	   Central	   America,	   «ancestor	   imagery»,	  
Stuart	   argues,	   was	   the	   force	   «behind	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   ancient	   Maya	   public	   art»	  
([1988]:	   221).	   In	   the	  Northwest	   Coast,	   every	   object	   of	   ritual	   importance	   (e.g.,	   canoes,	  
boxes,	   bowls,	   houses,	   poles,	   chairs,	   clothing,	   spoons,	   bracelets),	   Walens	   writes,	   «are	  
decorated	  with	  images	  of	  the	  clans	  mythic	  ancestors,	  with	  depictions	  of	  incidents	  in	  the	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clan’s	  history	  […].	  In	  some	  tribes,	  even	  people’s	  bodies	  were	  tattooed	  with	  images	  of	  the	  
clan’s	  ancestral	  spirit	  being»	  ([1993]:	  89).	  	   	  
The	   words	   conservative,	   traditional,	   ethnographic,	   and	   fixed	   style,	   when	   used	   to	  
refer	  to	  art,	  do	  not	   imply	  that	  the	  dance,	  song,	  stories,	  or	  plastic	  arts	  will	  be	  simple	  or	  
plain.	  The	  visual	  arts	  of	  China	  and	  Egypt,	  along	  with	  those	  produced	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  
world,	  were	   traditional;	  most	  would	  agree	   that	   they	  are	  attractive	   (some	  might	  prefer	  
the	  words	  aesthetically	  pleasing).	  This	  arts,	  however,	  were	  not	  creative	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  
constantly	  changing	  or	  being	  highly	  innovative.	  According	  to	  Hauser	  ([1959]:	  29),	  «some	  
of	  the	  most	  magnificent	  works	  of	  art	  originated	  […]	  in	  the	  Ancient	  Orient	  under	  the	  most	  
dire	   pressure	   imaginable	   [this	   proves]	   that	   there	   is	   no	   direct	   relationship	   between	  
personal	  freedom	  of	  the	  artists	  and	  the	  aesthetic	  quality	  of	  his	  works».	  	  
When	  reviewing	  the	  art	  produced	  by	  a	  traditional	  people,	  Hauser	  ([1959]:	  74)	  writes	  
that	  one	  cannot	   find	  «an	   individual	  style	  or	  personal	   ideals	  or	  ambitions	  –	  at	  any	  rate,	  
there	  is	  no	  sign	  whatsoever	  that	  the	  artist	  cherished	  any	  feelings	  of	  this	  sort.	  Soliloquies	  
such	  as	  the	  poems	  of	  Archilochus	  or	  Sappho	  […]	  the	  claim	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  all	  
other	  artists	  which	  is	  advanced	  by	  Aristonothos,	  attempts	  to	  say	  something	  already	  said	  
in	  a	  different,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  better	  fashion	  –	  all	  this	  is	  quite	  new	  and	  heralds	  a	  
development	  which	  now	  proceeds	  without	  a	  setback	  (apart	  from	  the	  early	  Middle	  Ages)	  
to	  the	  present	  day».	  	  
Firth	   ([1925]:	   283),	   an	   anthropologist	   writing	   about	   Maori	   artists,	   claimed	   that	  
«innovations	  were	  not	  permitted;	  innovations	  were	  seen	  as	  mistakes,	  which	  were	  aitua	  
(evil	  omens)».	  	   	  	  
I	   am	   not	   arguing	   here	   that	   there	   was	   never	   any	   change	   or	   variation	   in	   art.	   The	  
rainbow	   serpent	   design	   was	   used	   in	   Australia	   for	   6,000	   years;	   however,	   not	   every	  
serpent	   looked	   exactly	   the	   same.	   Traditional	   art,	   while	   maintaining	   strong	   historical	  
links,	   is	  not	   stagnant.	  When	  new	  elements	  are	   introduced,	   it	  often	   is	   claimed	   that	   the	  
new	  way	  of	  doing	  art	  was	  given	  to	  them	  by	  the	  ancestors	  in	  a	  dream.	  The	  changes	  were	  
not	   idiosyncratic.	   As	   Biebuyck	   ([1969]:	   12)	   recognized,	   when	   changes	   occur,	   the	   new	  
items	   are	   explained	   by	   drawing	   from	   «their	   patrimony	   of	   traditional	   interpretive	  
proverbs».	  	  
When	  creativity	  came	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  intelligence	  and	  freedom	  and	  highly	  valued	  
in	  Western	   societies,	   anthropologists	   began	   to	   regard	   traditions	   –	   this	   persistence,	   or	  
lack	  of	  change	  –	  as	  a	  negative	  and	  started	  to	  use	  words	  like	  prelogical,	  primitive,	  simple	  
to	  describe	  the	  non-­‐creative	  people	  they	  studied	  and	  terms	  like	  simple	  and	  primitive	  to	  
describe	  their	  art.	  The	  value	  that	  they	  placed	  on	  creativity	  influenced	  what	  they	  saw	  and	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how	  they	  interpreted	  it	   (see	  discussion	  in	  Biebuyck	  [1969]).	  Later	  anthropologists,	  who	  
practiced	  during	  a	  more	  politically	  correct	  era,	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  critical	  of	  other	  
cultural	  practices.	  They	  began	  to	  search	  feverishly	  for	  evidence	  of	  creativity,	  despite	  the	  
fact	  that	  amazing	  persistence	  they	  were	  observing	  was	  begging	  for	  explanation.	  	  
Summary	  and	  Discussion	  
When	  Dutton’s	  properties	  are	  reviewed,	  many	  of	  them,	  unfortunately,	  are	  not	  useful.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  	  







Direct	  Pleasure	   X	   X	   X	   Non-­‐testable	  
Emotional	  
Saturation	  
X	   X	   X	   Non-­‐testable	  
Intellectual	  
Challenge	  
X	   X	   X	   Non-­‐testable	  
Imaginative	  
Experience	  




X	   X,	   difficult	   at	  
times	   to	  
identify	  
	   Limited	   explanatory	  
ability	   –	   relevant	   to	  
more	   contemporary	  
forms	  of	  art	  
Skill	   or	  
virtuosity	  
X	   	   	   May	   have	   a	   limited	  
explanatory	   ability,	   to	  
the	   extent	   it	   implies	  
competition	  
Criticism	   X	   	   Refers	   to	  
the	  
response	  
Not	   a	   property	   of	   art,	  
but	   an	   hypothetical	  
response	  pattern.	  	  
Representation	   	   X,	   referent	   not	  
always	  
identifiable	  	  
	   Not	   always	   true	   of	   art,	  
as	  some	  forms	  seem	  to	  
represent	   nothing.	   This	  
focus	   gets	   us	   into	  
murky	   area	   of	  
symbolism.	  
Special	  Focus	   X	   X	   	   Vague,	   «special»	   is	   not	  
defined	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Art	   Traditions	  
&	  Institutions	  
X,	  incomplete	   	   	   May	  be	  relevant	  in	  that	  
most	  forms	  of	  art	  draw,	  
to	   some	   degree,	   on	  
traditions;	   however,	  
not	   all	   art	   is	   associated	  
with	   institutions	   or	   art	  
spaces.	  
Style	   	   	   	   Same	  as	  above	  
Novelty	   and	  
Creativity	  
X	   Identifiable	   as	  
change	  
	   Limited	   explanatory	  
ability	   –	   relevant	   to	  
more	   contemporary	  
forms	  of	  art	  
	  
In	   2010,	   Heywood,	   Garcia	   and	   Wilson	   argued	   that	   if	   we	   wish	   to	   understand	  
something	   like	   the	  arts,	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	   than	  merely	  apply	   the	  scientific	  method,	  
we	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  role	  culture	  as	  a	  «vital,	  shaping	  force»	  might	  play	   in	  
influencing	  behavior.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  integrate	  science	  and	  culture	  in	  
order	  to	  identify	  scientifically	  testable	  properties	  of	  art.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  
understand	   art,	   we	   cannot	   focus	   solely	   on	   its	   contemporary	   forms,	   we	   need	   to	  
understand	  art	  as	  it	  was	  produced	  throughout	  most	  of	  human	  history	  and	  prehistory.	  If	  
the	   reader	   wishes	   to	   dismiss	   the	   art	   produced	   during	   that	   period,	   it	   is	   his/her	  
responsibility	   to	   explain,	   without	   reference	   to	   nontestable	   emotions	   and/or	   intellect,	  
why	  that	  art	  is	  distinct.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  contemporary	  forms	  of	  art	  are	  not	  art.	  It	  
merely	  means	  that	  the	  patterns	  of	  production	  and	  usage	  differ	  significantly.	  
Further,	   if	   we	   accept	   that	   only	   humans	  make	   art,	   then	   we	  must	   ask	   why	   humans	  
regularly	   seem	  to	   find	  natural	  objects	   (e.g.,	  animal	  «art»,	   sunsets,	   colored	  stones)	  and	  
events,	  bird	  song	  and	  dance,	  for	  example,	  to	  be	  attractive,	  in	  that	  they	  attract	  and	  hold	  
our	   attention.	  What	   is	   it	   about	   animal	   «art»,	   sunsets,	   and	   colored	   stones,	   song,	   and	  
performance	  that	  makes	  it	  seem	  appropriate	  to	  refer	  to	  them,	  as	  is	  widely	  done,	  using	  
the	   term	  «art?»	   If	  we	  assume	   that	   there	   is	   some	   logic	   to	   this	  metaphorical	  extension,	  
perhaps	  understanding	  these	  attractions	  can	  help	  identify	  the	  literal	  meaning	  of	  art.	  
To	   address	   the	   question	   of	   what	   art’s	   identifiable	   properties	   might	   be,	   I	   turn	   to	  
Darwin	   ([1871]:	   59)	  who	  explained	   that	   language	   is	   an	   art,	   «in	   the	   sense	  of	   its	   having	  
been	   elaborately	   and	   methodically	   formed».	   Art,	   in	   other	   words,	   is	   an	   activity	   that	  
requires,	  or	  can	  be	  improved	  by	  practice.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  skill	  as	  a	  competitive	  
factor,	  a	  focus	  on	  control	  of	  technique	  places	  the	  emphasis	  on	  such	  things	  as	  what	  the	  
technique	  is,	  how	  control	   is	   identified,	  how	  it	   is	   learned,	  from	  whom	  it	   is	   learned,	  who	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uses	  it,	  how	  and	  if	  it	  persists,	  the	  social	  response	  to	  mastery	  of	  control,	  and	  whether	  or	  
not	  the	  control	  or	  the	  technique	  change	  or	  persist	  over	  time.	  Control	  of	  technique	  also	  
offers	   us	   a	   place	   to	   begin	   to	   identify	   stages	   of	   control,	   moving	   from	   poor	   control	   to	  
greater	   control	   and	   how	   long	   it	   might	   take	   to	   reach	   master	   and	   the	   steps	   that	   are	  
involved.	  	  
Another	  important	  art	  property	  is	  pattern,	  which	  Bateson	  ([1972]:	  131)	  described	  as	  
"any	  aggregate	  of	   events	  or	  objects	   [that]	   can	  be	  divided	   in	   any	  way	  by	  a	   slash	  mark,	  
such	  that	  an	  observer	  perceiving	  only	  what	   is	  on	  one	  side	  of	   the	  slash	  mark	  can	  guess	  
with	  better	  than	  random	  success,	  what	  is	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  slash	  mark".	  We	  refer	  
to	  aggregates	  as	  patterns	  when	  that	  aggregate’s	  extension	  can	  be	  predicted	  with	  greater	  
than	  chance	  success.	  Pattern’s	  importance	  may	  be	  lie	  outside	  of	  art,	  found	  in	  the	  many	  
advantages	  it	  offers	  humans	  in	  identifying	  and	  re-­‐identifying	  objects,	  and	  thus	  in	  making	  
choices	  (Hilbert	  [1987]).	  
	  Patterns	   of	   sound,	   movement,	   color,	   line,	   pattern,	   and/or	   form	   have	   no	   function	  
other	  than	  attracting	  attention,	  perhaps,	  as	  we	  might	  ascertain	  someday,	  by	  provoking	  
emotions.	  They	  do	  not,	   for	  example,	  keep	  bodies	  healthy	  (that	  may	  be	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  
dance),	  make	  people	  «happy»	  (listening	  to	  stories,	  singing	  songs),	  add	  structural	  support	  
to	   a	  wall	   or	   pottery	   vessel,	   act	   as	   a	   preservative,	   such	   as	   in	   tanning	   pelts,	   or	   prevent	  
dental	  caries	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  tooth	  straining).	  
Humans	  have	   evolved	   the	   ability	   to	   respond	   to	  patterns	   of	  movement,	   sound,	   and	  
color,	   line,	   pattern,	   and/or	   form.	   For	   thousands	   of	   years,	   and	   often	   at	   the	  
encouragement	   of	   others,	   artists	   have	   exploited	   this	   tendency	   in	   order	   to	   influence	  
social	  behavior.	  While	  art	  may	  be	  much	  more	  than	  pattern	  and	  control	  of	  technique	  that	  
are	  used	  to	  attract	  attention,	  these	  two	  properties	  provide	  a	  start	  for	  future	  discussion	  
(Coe	  [2003]).	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